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Abstract:  
Two firms produce a good with a horizontal and a vertical characteristic called quality. 
The difference in the unobservable quality levels determines how the firms share the 
market. We consider two scenarios: in the first one, firms disclose quality; in the second 
one, they send costly signals thereof. Under non-comparative advertising a firm 
advertises its own quality, under comparative advertising a firm advertises the quality 
differential. In either scenario, under comparative advertising the firms never advertise 
together which they may do under non-comparative advertising. Moreover, under 
comparative advertising firms do not advertise when the informational value to 
consumers is small. 
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1 Introduction
Comparative advertising is any form of advertising that explicitly or by im-
plication identifies a competitor or goods or services offered by a competitor.
It was illegal in many European countries until the late 1990s. By contrast,
in the US comparative advertising has been encouraged by the Federal Trade
Commission since the 1970’s. A 1997 EU directive changed the situation in
Europe by legalizing comparative advertising subject to the restriction that
it should not be misleading.1 European Competition Authorities now tend to
agree with their American counterparts in that comparative advertising is an
important tool in promoting competition. Comparative advertising increases
consumers’ information about alternative products. It allows consumers to
evaluate the performance of particular products against other products, thus
enabling more informed purchasing decisions.
Despite its importance there has been little economic analysis on compar-
ative advertising. We will review this literature at the end of the introduction.
In this paper we address the following questions. Does comparative advertis-
ing indeed generate more information for consumers than non-comparative
advertising? Do firms advertise more once comparative advertising is allowed
for? Can the two advertising regimes be compared using welfare criteria?
To answer these questions we consider a product with a horizontal char-
acteristic called design and a vertical characteristic called quality. Two firms
produce different designs. Consumers do not observe quality before purchase.
Prices cannot signal quality.2 The firms compete for customers by advertis-
ing their quality. We first analyze a pure disclosure framework. If a firm
advertises, it discloses the truth; it cannot falsify as such.3 We compare two
1Directive 97/55/EC, see Barigozzi and Peitz (2006) for more details. European courts
tend to follow a literal interpretation of quality claims, whereas U.S. courts ask whether
consumers are actually misled.
2In section 2 we explain why prices are not used as a signalling device. Alternatively,
we could assume that prices are regulated or that upstream manufacturers impose resale
price maintenance on retailers.
3Advertisements communicate, e.g., hard information about technical features. False
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scenarios. In the first one, firms can only engage in non-comparative adver-
tising, i.e., a firm may disclose its own quality but not the competitor’s one.
In the second scenario, the firms can also engage in comparative advertising.
In both scenarios advertising is costly and firms may, therefore, choose to
remain silent.
In the non-comparative framework a firm advertises if its quality level
is above a threshold. If the quality is below the threshold, a firm remains
silent; the cost of sending the message is higher than the gain thereof. When
both firms’ quality is below the threshold, neither advertises and they share
the market equally. When only one firm’s quality is above the threshold, the
high quality firm advertises while the low quality one says nothing. The high
quality firm then has more customers. When both firms have high quality,
both advertise. This may be highly inefficient: if both firms have the same
high quality, both advertise at a cost yet still share the market equally.
In the second scenario firms may also engage in comparative advertising,
meaning that firms disclose the quality differential. When both advertising
formats are possible, consumers interpret non-comparative advertisements as
implying that the quality differential is actually small; had it been high, the
firm would have disclosed the quality differential. This unraveling implies
that firms do not use non-comparative advertising; they either send com-
parative messages or do not advertise at all. If the quality differential is
small, neither firm advertises. If it is large, the high quality firm advertises
while the low quality one is silent. In equilibrium the firms never advertise
together.
Comparative advertising tends to perform better than non-comparative
advertising. Firms do not advertise if the quality differential is small and the
information is of little value to consumers. If, however, the quality differential
is large, the high quality firm advertises while the low quality one remains
silent. There is no duplication of advertisement expenditures. By contrast,
advertising is deterred by the threat of lawsuits.
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when only non-comparative advertising is allowed, firms advertise their high
quality independently of their rival’s quality level. Both firms may then
advertise even when the information is of little or no value to consumers.
Next we look at the case where advertisments cannot provide hard infor-
mation.4 The firms now try to convince consumers of their quality (or the
quality differential) by sending advertisements with expensive features such
as highly paid celebrities expressing satisfaction with the product. By assum-
ing that the costs depend on quality and satisfy the single-crossing property,
we model persuasion as a signalling game. For instance, a celebrity may be
reluctant to praise a product she experienced to be inferior. In equilibrium, if
firms advertise, they spend money on expensive advertising to convince con-
sumers of their quality. Consumers rationally infer the true quality from the
advertisements. Otherwise, the equilibria have essentially the same structure
as in the pure disclosure framework. In particular, in the signalling set-up
the states of the world where firms advertise or are silent are exactly the same
as under disclosure. The welfare comparison, however, is now somewhat less
in favor of comparative advertising. Signalling costs may blur the picture,
making the comparison more ambiguous.
Let us now review the literature. The marketing literature has discussed
comparative advertising quite extensively; see Grewal et al. (1997) for a
survey. There is, however, little economics literature on comparative adver-
tising. Anderson and Renault (2009) consider comparative advertising with
respect to horizontal characteristics. If qualities are sufficiently different, the
low quality firm will disclose horizontal attributes of both products. The
main difference to our approach is that advertising is costless.
Barigozzi, Garella, and Peitz (2009) consider an incumbent with known
4Our distinction between hard and soft information is standard. Real life situations
often fall somewhat in between. In 2009 telecommunications companies in Canada engaged
in legal fights over their advertising campaigns. Rogers Communications sued Bell Mobility
for describing its network as “the best and most powerful”. Earlier Rogers had been sued
by Telus for claiming it had the “fastest and most reliable network”. Arguably, the legal
suits served as advertising instruments.
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quality facing an entrant with unknown quality. The entrant can choose
generic advertising which is standard money burning to signal quality. More-
over, the entrant can choose comparative advertising which involves a com-
parison of the two firms’ qualities; this involves the risk that the incumbent
may sue. By resorting to comparative advertising, the entrant signals that he
has a strong case. Comparative advertising can signal quality in those cases
where generic advertising cannot. An important difference to our model is
that only the entrant can choose to advertise.
Anderson et al. (2010 a,b) empirically study advertising in the US over-
the-counter analgesics industry. Almost half the ad spending in their sample
was on comparative advertisements; all firms had some comparative ads.
Brands with better characteristics transmit more information. Compara-
tive ads contain significantly more information than non-comparative self-
promoting advertisements. The evidence that all firms use comparative ad-
vertising is at odds with our finding that only one firm does so. One possible
explanation is that in the analgesics market quality has multiple dimensions
and firms claim superiority in dimensions where they perform better.
More generally, our analysis is related to the industrial organization liter-
ature on advertising as quality disclosure or quality signalling. Levin, Peck,
and Ye (2009) analyze a duopoly where firms can disclose their own quality
by presenting verifiable information. In Daughety and Reinganum (2008),
a monopolist may choose between costly disclosure or signalling his quality
through prices. These papers only allow for non-comparative advertising.
Our analysis is also related to disclosure games with multiple interested par-
ties sharing the same information, as in Milgrom and Roberts (1986b).
An important literature, going back to Milgrom and Roberts (1986a),
analyzes quality signalling via prices or advertising as money burning. This
literature has mainly dealt with the case of a monopolist, i.e., it has con-
sidered one-sender games. An exception is Daughety and Reinganum (2007)
who consider signalling through prices in a duopoly. Two other exceptions,
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more closely related to the present analysis, are Hertzendorf and Overgaard
(2001) and Fluet and Garella (2002). In these papers the duopolists know
each other’s quality. In the resulting equilibria, signalling is either through
prices alone or through the price-advertising mix. In the present paper, sig-
nalling through prices is not feasible. Moreover, we focus on the case where
both firms may jointly signal about the same variable, namely the quality
differential.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section
we describe the model and derive the equilibrium prices. Section 3 analyzes
the pure disclosure and section 4 the signalling framework.
2 The Model
Consider two firms 1 and 2 which produce products having two characteris-
tics. The first characteristic is horizontal; we call it design. Firm 1 produces
design 1 and firm 2 produces design 2. For example, design could refer to
the interface in an operating system (Mac OS X vs. the Microsoft Windows
or Symbian vs. Android), the location of a vacation resort (mountains vs.
seaside) or the place where a cigar is produced (Cuba or the Dominican Re-
public). The second characteristic is vertical and concerns the quality of a
particular feature; we will refer to it as firm i’s quality qi ∈ [0, 1], i ∈ {1, 2}.
Production costs are normalized to zero, i.e., they are independent of design
and quality. Firm i charges the price pi.
There are three groups of consumers: a mass M of firm 1 loyal consumers,
a mass M of firm 2 loyal consumers, and a mass 1 of quality-conscious con-
sumers. All consumers wish to buy at most one unit of the product. Loyal
consumers do not care about the feature’s quality. The utility of a firm i
loyal consumer is 1 − pi if he buys from firm i, −pj if he buys from firm j,
and 0 if he does not buy at all. It is straightforward to verify that in the
absence of quality-conscious consumers the Bertrand equilibrium prices are
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equal to 1, yielding profit M for each firm.
Let us now turn to quality-conscious customers who care about design
and quality and thus have higher willingness-to-pay. A quality-conscious
consumer’s utility is given as
U =

1− p1 + 2q1 − θ, if he buys from firm 1;
1− p2 + 2q2 + θ, if he buys from firm 2;
0, if he does not buy,
where θ is uniform on [−θˆ, θˆ], θˆ > 1. The parameter θ measures the intensity
with which a consumer cares about design. If θ is close to zero, design is
not of great importance for the consumer and he cares more about quality.
By contrast, if θ is close to the boundaries of the support, the consumer is
a design aficionado for whom quality is of minor importance. The larger θˆ,
the more the average quality-conscious consumer cares about design.
To derive demand consider first the case where both prices are low enough
for the market to be covered. Suppose for the time being that quality is
observable before purchase. Which design a consumer chooses depends on
prices, on his θ, and on the difference in quality levels x := q2 − q1; the
consumer θ buys from firm 2 rather than from firm 1 if −p2 + 2q2 + θ ≥
−p1 + 2q1 − θ or θ ≥ −x+ .5(p2 − p1).
Firm 1’s demand (market share) from quality-conscious consumers is∫ −x+.5(p2−p1)
−θˆ
1
2θˆ
dθ =
1
2
− x
2θˆ
− p2 − p1
4θˆ
;
firm 2’s demand is∫ θˆ
−x+.5(p2−p1)
1
2θˆ
dθ =
1
2
+
x
2θˆ
− p1 − p2
4θˆ
.
Suppose both firms charge the same price. If q1 = q2, equivalently x = 0,
both firms share the market of quality-conscious consumers; if q1 < q2 or
x > 0, firm 2 has more than half of the market; if q1 > q2 or x < 0, firm
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1 has more than half of the market. The marginal impact of x on profits is
+(−)1/2θˆ: the less consumers care about design (the smaller θˆ), the higher
the impact of the quality differential.
Next let us look at the case where firm 2 is a monopolist. Moreover,
suppose q2 = 1. We thus consider the best possibility for firm 2: it is a
monopolist with the highest possible quality level; furthermore, consumers
are aware of this quality so that the firm incurs no advertising expenditures.
Consumer θ buys 2’s product if θ + 3 − p2 ≥ 0. On the market segment
of quality-conscious consumers firm 2 thus faces demand .5 − (p2 − 3)/2θˆ.
Maximizing profits with respect to this group of consumers yields p∗2 = θˆ/2+
1.5 > 1 and profits pi∗2 = θˆ/8 + .75 + 9/8θˆ. pi
∗
2 is the upper bound on profits
that can be made with quality-conscious customers; firm 2’s profit can only
be lower if firm 1 competes or consumers do not observe the feature’s quality
so that the firm has to advertise at a cost.
Finally, take the two segments together. We may now state a preliminary
result.
Lemma 1: If M > pi∗2, p1 = p2 = 1 in equilibrium.
This result follows immediately. Each product is sold at a uniform price,
i.e., firms cannot discriminate between quality-conscious and loyal consumers.
If firm 2 charges p2 = 1, it serves at least its loyal customers who generate
profit M . If it charges p2 > 1, it loses its loyal customers and serves, if at
all, only quality-conscious customers. The maximum profit it can make on
this market segment is pi∗2. If M > pi
∗
2, firm 2 prefers to serve both market
segments, which it optimally does by charging p2 = 1; by symmetry, this
condition also ensures that firm 1 charges p1 = 1 in equilibrium. We assume
M > pi∗2 so that Lemma 1 holds.
As an example for our model think of cell phones. Customers tend to
be loyal to different operating system. As the feature take the cell phone’s
camera. It is virtually impossible these days to get a cell phone without a
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camera even though a lot of customers never use it. Yet some consumers, say,
youngsters use the camera and care about its quality. The cost of adding the
camera is small and it allows firms to gain market share in this segment of
the market. Similarly, a vacation resort may build additional sports facilities
to attract quality-conscious customers; it refrains from increasing prices in
order not to lose loyal customers.
It remains to be explained why a firm doesn’t produce two versions of
the product, one with the feature and one without. Here we assume that
there are economies of scale in production, making one large production run
cheaper than two small ones. Finally, firms add the feature to the product not
to get higher prices but to gain market share. If, say, firm 2 adds the feature
while 1 doesn’t, 2 gains the market segment of quality-conscious customers;
if 2 drops the feature while 1 hangs on to it, 2 loses its share of the quality-
conscious consumers. Therefore, if the cost of the feature is low, it is indeed
optimal for both firms to add the feature to the product.
Let us now turn to the information structure. Quality-conscious con-
sumers know the designs but do not observe the quality levels: the products
are experience goods. We assume that q˜1 and q˜2 are independent and uni-
formly distributed on the unit interval. Without any additional information
consumers expect E(q˜1) = E(q˜2) = .5 and the firms share the market equally.
Unless q1 = q2, this allocation is inefficient. If consumers learn, say, x > 0,
consumers with θ ∈ [−x, 0] buy from firm 2 rather than firm 1. When they
buy from 1, their surplus is
∫ 0
−x(−θ+2q1)/2θˆ dθ; buying from 2 generates the
surplus
∫ 0
−x(θ+ 2(q1 + x))/2θˆ dθ. Becoming informed about x thus increases
surplus by x2/2θˆ. This expression also applies when x < 0.
Informing consumers about quality therefore not only redistributes prof-
its, but typically also enhances efficiency. To put it differently, advertising
quality in our set-up is on the one hand combative, acting to redistribute con-
sumers among firms; on the other hand it is informative, increasing consumer
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surplus.5
In the sequel, we analyze how firms compete through advertising in order
to increase their market share of quality-conscious consumers. The timing is
as follows. In stage 0, the firms learn their qualities and consumers learn their
type. In stage 1, the firms simultaneously send messages about the qualities;
this includes the possibility of saying nothing. In stage 2, consumers observe
the messages, draw inferences, and make their purchasing decisions.
3 Disclosure
3.1 Non-comparative advertising
In this section each firm may inform consumers about its own quality but not
about the quality of its competitor. If firm i advertises, it sends the message
yi = qi at a fixed cost γ. Alternatively, the firm may remain silent which we
denote by yi = ∅i; remaining silent involves no cost.
We confine our attention to monotonic strategies: If a firm discloses when
the state is (q1, q2), it also discloses in more favorable states. The state
(q′1, q
′
2) is (weakly) more favorable for firm i than (q1, q2) if q
′
i ≥ qi and q′j ≤
qj, i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j. A more favorable state for firm i obviously implies
a larger quality differential qi − qj. The converse is, however, not true. For
example, if both qualities go down, yet q1 more so than q2, the differential
becomes more favorable for firm 2. Note that as an immediate implication of
monotonicity, if, say, firm 1 does not advertise in some state, it also doesn’t
advertise in less favorable states.
In the first stage of the game firms choose simultaneously whether or not
to advertise. In the second stage consumers observe the firms’ actions and
form beliefs E(x|y1, y2) = E(q2|y1, y2) − E(q1|y1, y2). Consumers buy from
the firm maximizing expected utility, i.e., consumers with θ < E(x|y1, y2)
buy design 1 and the rest design 2. If firm 1 doesn’t advertise, its profit (net
5For a survey of the different views on advertising see, e.g., Bagwell (2007).
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of profits from loyal customers) is .5−E(x|∅1, y2)/2θˆ; if it discloses q1, profit
is .5 − E(x|q1, y2)/2θˆ − γ. Similarly, firm 2’s profits are .5 + E(x|y1, ∅2)/2θˆ
and .5 +E(x|y1, q2)/2θˆ− γ. Firms choose their advertising strategy so as to
maximize expected profits. We look for symmetric perfect Bayesian equilib-
ria.
Let us now derive the firms’ strategies. Fix q2 and consider firm 1. Due to
monotonicity, if firm 1 discloses at some quality level q1, it will also disclose
any quality above this level; if it is silent at q1, it is also silent for any quality
below this level. Firm 1 thus plays a threshold strategy of being silent if
its quality is below some q01(q2) and of disclosing if its quality is above the
threshold.
Now consider the message (∅1, q2). Consumers know 2’s quality; moreover,
they know that q1 is below q
0
1(q2). Therefore, consumers rationally expect
E(q1|∅1, q2) = q01(q2)/2. At the threshold, firm 1 is indifferent between dis-
closing and being silent. If it is silent, its profit is .5 − [q2 − q01(q2)/2]/2θˆ;
if it discloses, its profit is .5 − [q2 − q01(q2)]/2θˆ − γ. The firm is indifferent
between advertising and silence for q01(q2) = 4θˆγ. Note that firm 1’s equilib-
rium strategy is independent of q2. By symmetry, the same argument applies
to firm 2. To sum up:6
Proposition 1: In the unique equilibrium, if qi < 4θˆγ, firm i chooses ∅i;
consumers correctly expect E(qi | ∅i) = 2θˆγ. If qi ≥ 4θˆγ, firm i discloses by
choosing yi = qi, i ∈ {1, 2}.
The outcome is depicted in Figure 1. If both firms have quality levels
below 4θˆγ, neither advertises. Consumers rationally expect average quality
2θˆγ of each firm. The more consumers care about design or the higher the
cost of advertising, the larger the non-advertising range. If one firm’s quality
level is below while the other firm’s is above the threshold, the high quality
6When we call an equilibrium unique, we mean unique except for the behavior at
possible thresholds where players are indifferent.
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one advertises while the low quality one doesn’t. Consumers know the quality
of the advertising firm and expect 2θˆγ of the non-advertising one. When both
quality levels are above the threshold, both firms advertise. Consumers know
both quality levels and thus the quality differential. The game has prisoners’
dilemma features. If, say, q1 = q2 > 4θˆγ, both firms advertise yet share the
market equally. They spend resources on disclosing without raising consumer
surplus.
2q
1q
1 2( , )q q
1
1
1 2( , )q1 2( , )
1 2( , )q
ˆ4
Figure 1: Non-comparative advertising
ˆ4
3.2 Comparative advertising
When comparative advertising is allowed, firms may disclose the difference
in quality levels, the variable consumers are ultimately interested in; the cost
of doing so is again γ. Firm i may remain silent ∅i, it may reveal its own
quality qi, or it may disclose both its quality and that of its competitor; the
latter will be referred to as disclosure of the quality difference x = q2 − q1.7
The choice of the advertising format obviously has informational content.
To see this, suppose firm 1 is silent while firm 2 discloses q2. Consumers have
7A firm may not engage im purely “negative advertising”, i.e., disclose only the low
quality of its competitor. Allowing this advertising format would not affect the results:
our unraveling arguments also rule out negative advertising at equilibrium.
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to form beliefs about q1. They use the information that firm 2 could have used
comparative advertising at no additional cost but preferred not to do so. If q1
is small and thus x large, 2 will most likely use comparative advertising. If q1
is large, firm 2 will prefer to disclose only q2 and leave consumers in the dark
about q1. Accordingly, the non-comparative advertisement suggests that q1
is large and thus x small, making non-comparative advertising unattractive.
Before we can make these observations precise, we need to extend the
concept of monotonic strategies: If a firm advertises in some state, it contin-
ues to do so in more favorable states. Moreover, if a firm uses comparative
advertising in some state, it also does so in more favorable states. Mono-
tonicity implies that when states become more favorable, a firm switches
from no to non-comparative to comparative advertising or directly from no
to comparative advertising.8
Lemma 2: If firms may engage in comparative as well as non-comparative
advertising, they never use non-comparative advertising in equilibrium. Ei-
ther they disclose x or they remain silent.
Let us explain the main ideas. Consider first a pair of messages of the
form (q′1, x) where firm 1 advertises non-comparatively while firm 2 advertises
comparatively. Such a pair cannot be part of an equilibrium: if firm 1 stops
advertising, it doesn’t change consumers’ beliefs, yet saves the advertising
cost. Suppose next that the pair (∅1, q2) is played at equilibrium. Let S be
the set of values for q1 consistent with these messages. Denote by qˆ1 the
inference drawn by consumers, i.e., the expected value of firm 1’s quality
conditional on S. If this set is not a singleton, qˆ1 > 0 and there are values
q1 ∈ S below qˆ1. However, this yields a contradiction because firm 2 would
be better off revealing its rival’s quality whenever q1 < qˆ1. Hence S must be
a singleton, i.e., S = {qˆ1}. Thus, the pair of messages (∅1, q2) can only arise
8When we use never we mean almost never, i.e., except possibly at isolated points in
the state space.
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when firm 1’s quality is qˆ1, that is, almost never; moreover consumers have
exactly the same information and the outcome is the same as if firm 2 had
used comparative advertising. Finally, a pair of messages (q′1, q2) also cannot
be part of an equilibrium. If it were, monotonicity would imply that firm 2
also advertises at q1 ≤ q′1. Suppose it sticks to non-comparative advertising.
For q1 sufficiently small, however, firm 1 will prefer not to advertise: it would
rather be seen to have zero quality than pay γ to be perceived as a low quality
firm. Hence, for all values of q1 sufficiently small, the pair (∅1, q2) would be
played at equilibrium, contradicting the preceding argument that such a pair
cannot be part of an equilibrium, except possibly at an isolated point. The
proof is completed in the Appendix.
Given that firms only use comparative or no advertisements, the following
result follows immediately. Note that since q˜1 and q˜2 are independent and
uniform on the unit interval, x˜ has the unimodal density
f(x˜) =
{
1 + x, if x ∈ [−1, 0);
1− x, if x ∈ [0, 1].
Proposition 2: In the unique equilibrium, if x ∈ [−1,−2θˆγ], firm 1 discloses
x while firm 2 doesn’t advertise. If x ∈ (−2θˆγ, 2θˆγ), neither firm advertises.
If x ∈ [2θˆγ, 1], firm 2 discloses x and firm 1 doesn’t advertise. If neither firm
advertises, consumers rationally expect a quality differential of zero.
Proof: Firms will never advertise together. If, say, firm 1 deviates to ∅1
while firm 2 continues to disclose x, firm 1 doesn’t change the consumers’
decisions and saves the cost γ. Suppose consumers believe E(x|∅1, ∅2) = xˆ
when neither firm advertises. Suppose firm 1 is silent. Firm 2 will disclose x
if x − 2θˆγ > xˆ; otherwise, it is better off remaining silent. Likewise, firm 1
will disclose x if −x−2θˆγ > −xˆ and otherwise is silent. Therefore, consumers
know that x ∈ (xˆ− θˆγ, xˆ+ θˆγ) when both firms do not advertise. Given that
f(x) is unimodal, xˆ = E(x|x ∈ (xˆ− θˆγ, xˆ+ θˆγ)] is possible only if xˆ = 0. 
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Figure 2: Comparative advertising
The outcome is depicted in Figure 2. Note that unlike in the case of
non-comparative advertising, the firms never advertise together. When the
quality differential and thus the informational value to consumers is small,
the firms do not advertise. Only when the differential is sufficiently large, the
firm with the better quality advertises while the other firm remains silent.
Unlike in the case of non-comparative advertising, a firm’s strategy is not
independent of the other firm’s quality.
3.3 Welfare
To compare the welfare properties of our equilibria under non-comparative
and comparative advertising consider Figure 3. Here we assume that 4θˆγ < 1,
otherwise the firms never advertise when only non-comparative advertising
is allowed.
Under non-comparative advertising no firm advertises in the areas a and b;
one firm advertises in the areas c1, c2 and d, providing imperfect information
about the quality differential; in the areas e and f both firms advertise and
provide perfect information. When comparative advertising is allowed, no
firm advertises in a, d, and f ; one firm advertises in the area b, c1, c2, and
e, providing perfect information about the quality differential.
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Figure 3: Welfare comparison
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Recall that welfare increases by x2/2θˆ when consumers learn x. Adver-
tising is socially desirable if the gain from informing consumers exceeds the
cost. Advertising costs γ when only one firm advertises. A necessary con-
dition for advertising to be desirable is therefore |x| ≥
√
2θˆγ. Note that
2θˆγ < 1 implies 2θˆγ <
√
2θˆγ < 1. Advertising is thus inefficient in the
non-shaded area of Figure 3.
In areas a, d, and f advertising is inefficient: providing perfect informa-
tion about x is not worth the expenditure γ. In area a firms don’t advertise
in both the non-comparative and the comparative scenario, thus welfare is
the same. In areas d and f firms don’t advertise under comparative adver-
tising. Under non-comparative advertising one firm advertises in area d and
both firms advertise in area f . Therefore, comparative advertising performs
better than non-comparative advertising in the areas d and f .
In c1 and c2 one firm advertises under either regime. The non-comparative
advertiser reveals only his own quality whereas the comparative advertiser
discloses the quality differential. Thus, information is better under com-
parative advertising. In e the information is the same under both regimes.
However, costs are duplicated under non-comparative advertising.
Finally, consider region b. When
√
2θˆγ < 4θˆγ as represented in the
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figure, region b can be partitioned in two subareas: one where x ≤
√
2θˆγ
and one where x >
√
2θˆγ. In the first subarea disclosure by the comparative
advertiser is not worth its cost. Hence, non-comparative advertising now
does better because nobody advertises. In the second subarea disclosure is
efficient; under comparative advertising a firm discloses while under non-
comparative advertising firms remain silent. When
√
2θˆγ > 4θˆγ, advertising
is not worth the cost in the whole of region b.
To sum up, allowing comparative advertising (weakly) improves welfare
apart from region b or a subarea thereof. Except for region b, comparative
advertising has the following virtues. First, there is less advertising when
the information is of little value to consumers (in d and f). Second, ads are
more informative: either consumers obtain more information for the same
advertising expenditure (in c1 and c2) or the same information is conveyed
at a lower cost because there is no duplication (in e). In region b the welfare
effects are ambiguous.
Finally, consider the case where 2θˆγ < 1 < 4θˆγ. Now firms do not adver-
tise unless comparative advertising is allowed. In Figure 3 the only remaining
regions are now a and b. The welfare effects of comparative advertising are
therefore ambiguous.
4 Signalling
Now consider the case where quality is unverifiable so that it cannot be simply
disclosed. Firms will then attempt to persuade or convince consumers of
their product’s quality. We model this as a signalling game. Consumers are
persuaded when they rationally infer quality from the costly signals sent by
firms. As signals we take advertisements that, for example, make the product
look attractive. Developing an attractive advertisement is easier when the
product is of high quality, i.e., the cost depends on the firm’s actual quality
or the quality differential. We focus on separating equilibria.
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4.1 Non-comparative advertising
The cost of advertising is now given by c(y, q) where y is the message that the
advertisement embodies. In addition to the many features it can incorporate,
y is taken to have “literal meaning” concerning the quality of the product.9
For example, in an ad featuring a SUV, the literal meaning is that the vehicle
has extraordinary maneuverability even in the roughest and most exotic of
terrains. The message is a claim or story conveyed in such a way that the
literal meaning looks real. This is so even when the claim exceeds the range
of feasible qualities and would, therefore, be perceived as somewhat fanciful.
The costs of claims that look real depend on the product’s actual quality.
Therefore, under appropriate conditions, y can play the role of a signal.
The function c(y, q) reaches a strict global minimum at y = q with respect
to y in which case c(q, q) = γ. Thus, the least costly claim is the one closest
to the product’s actual quality. The intuition is that for such a claim to look
real requires no fabrication. Moreover, cy(y, q) = 0 has the unique solution
y = q and cyq(y, q) < 0. The last condition is the single-crossing property,
i.e., the marginal cost of improving a story decreases with actual quality.
Denote consumers’ inferences about quality by qˆi, i ∈ {1, 2}. If firm 2
advertises, its payoff is pi2 = (.5− qˆ1/2θˆ) + qˆ2/2θˆ − c(y2, q2). We consider an
equilibrium where qˆ1 does not depend on the actions of firm 2. Accordingly,
from the point of view of firm 2, the expression inside the parentheses is
a constant, say, k. Dropping the subscript, firm 2’s payoff is then pi =
k + qˆ/2θˆ − c(y, q). A similar expression holds for firm 1.
Let y = s(q) be the strategy played by a firm when it advertises. If the
strategy is separating, (i) it is monotonic and consumers infer qˆ = s−1(y) from
the observation of y; (ii) it maximizes the firm’s payoff given the inferences
drawn by consumers. These conditions imply
9The expression is borrowed from Kartik’s (2009) analysis of general one-sender com-
munication games.
18
q = arg max
qˆ
k + qˆ/2θˆ − γ − c(s(qˆ), q), (1)
i.e., the firm has no incentive to dissemble and the consumers’ inferences are
correct. The necessary first-order condition for (1) is
1/2θˆ − cy(s(q), q)s′(q) = 0. (2)
From our disclosure results we know that it is not worth advertising at a cost
of γ when the quality is less than q0 = 4γθˆ. Accordingly, we take the solution
to (1) with initial condition s(q0) = q0. The signalling strategies then satisfy
the so-called Riley or least-cost signalling condition. It also follows that
s(q) solving (2) implies (1), i.e., the first-order condition is sufficient for a
global maximum; see Mailath (1987) for the general signalling game with a
continuum of types.
The single-crossing condition cyq < 0 implies s
′(q) > 0 so that strategies
are indeed monotonic.10 Note that s′(q) > 0 implies cy(s(q), q) > 0 over the
range where the strategy is defined. Because c(y, q) is minimized at y = q,
the preceding inequality implies s(q) > q for q > q0. Thus, except at the
threshold, advertising messages overstate the true quality.
Proposition 3: In a least-cost equilibrium, if qi < 4θˆγ, firm i chooses ∅i;
consumers correctly expect E(qi | ∅i) = 2θˆγ. If qi ≥ 4θˆγ, firm i sends the
message yi = s(q) > 0 solving (2) with s(4γθˆ) = 4γθˆ; consumers infer the
true quality level qi, i ∈ {1, 2}.
In our signalling equilibrium the states of the world where firms advertise
or are silent are exactly the same as in our pure disclosure framework; see
10The necessary second-order condition is −cy(s(q), q)s′′(q) − cyy(s(q), q)(s′(q))2 ≤ 0.
Differentiating (2) yields
cy(s(q), q)s′′(q) + cyy(s(q), q)(s′(q))2 + cyq(s(q), q)s′(q) ≡ 0,
so that the second-order condition can be written as cyq(s(q), q)s′(q) ≤ 0. Since s′(q) = 0
is inconsistent with (2), s′(q) > 0.
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Figure 1. Nevertheless, firms now spend additional resources to communicate
their quality. The only way to credibly convey the true quality is to make
costly claims whose literal meaning exaggerates the true quality. Consumers
do not take the literal meaning at face value. They downplay the claims and
infer the true quality.
To illustrate, consider the quadratic cost function c(y, q) = γ+ .5(y− q)2.
The equilibrium message is then the solution to
y − [1− e−2θˆ(y−4θˆγ)]/2θˆ = q with y ≥ q ≥ 4θˆγ. (3)
This strategy is shown in Figure 4. At equilibrium the advertising cost is
increasing and concave in the product’s true quality.
iq
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Figure 4: The signalling strategy with quadratic cost
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4.2 Comparative advertising
Comparative advertisements mean that firms send messages zi, i ∈ {1, 2}
about the difference in quality levels x = q2− q1. The interpretation is again
that zi has literal meaning and must look real. The cost of the message is
c(zi, x). For parsimony we use the same notation as for non-comparative ads
even though the function need not be the same. However, it satisfies the
same basic conditions: cz(z, x) = 0 has the unique solution z = x which
minimizes c(z, x) with respect to z, c(x, x) = γ, and czx(z, x) < 0.
Firm i may remain silent ∅i, send a non-comparative signal yi, or a com-
parative message zi. As in the pure disclosure game the choice of the ad-
vertising format may have informational content. Yet, now advertising costs
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are not constant; they vary with the state of the world and the contents
of the message. Moreover, the cost of a comparative message will in gen-
eral differ from that of a non-comparative message. Therefore, we cannot
show in general that firms will not use non-comparative ads when compar-
ative advertising is allowed. Nevertheless, for the sake of comparison, we
will exhibit equilibria where the firms only send comparative messages. In
these equilibria, consumers may be described as expecting comparative ads.
They hold beliefs that punish non-comparative advertisers. As a result, yi is
never played at equilibrium. We make this precise in the proof of the next
proposition.
When firm 1 advertises, its payoff is pi1 = .5−xˆ/2θˆ−c(z1, x) where xˆ is the
consumers’ inference about the quality differential. Suppose firm 2 remains
silent and xˆ depends only on the message z1 sent by firm 1. Applying the
same argument as in the non-comparative section, the separating strategy
z1 = σ1(x) must be a solution to the first-order condition
−1/2θˆ − cz(σ1(x), x)σ′1(x) = 0. (4)
We take the solution with initial condition σ1(x
0
1) = x
0
1 where x
0
1 = −2θˆγ, the
same threshold as in the disclosure set-up. This ensures least-cost signalling.
Similarly, when firm 2 advertises, its payoff is pi2 = .5 + xˆ/2θˆ − c(z2, x). If
firm 1 is silent and xˆ depends only on z2, a separating strategy for firm 2 is
z2 = σ2(x) solving the first-order condition
1/2θˆ − cz(σ2(x), x)σ′2(x) = 0. (5)
We take the solution with initial condition σ2(x
0
2) = x
0
2 where x
0
2 = 2θˆγ.
Again the same argument as for non-comparative ads show that σ′i(x) > 0,
i ∈ {1, 2}. In equation (4) this implies cz(σ1(x), x) < 0 over the range where
the strategy is defined. In equation (5) it implies cz(σ2(x), x) > 0 over the
relevant range. Together with the initial conditions, the foregoing properties
in turn imply that σ1(x) is defined for x ≤ x01 with σ1(x) < x when the
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differential is below the threshold; that σ2(x) is defined for x ≥ x02 with
σ2(x) > x when the differential is above the threshold. Thus, the literal
meaning of firm 2’s message is to overstate the actual quality differential; that
of firm 1 to understate it, equivalently to overstate the reverse differential
q1 − q2.
These separating strategies are derived following the approach of one-
sender signalling games; that is, each firm’s strategy is obtained under the
assumption that the other firm remained silent. In our set-up, however, both
players share the same information and can communicate about the same
variable, i.e., we have a two-sender game. This raises the possibility that
both players could simultaneously advertise comparatively and send conflict-
ing signals. One firm’s signal could then “jam” the other firm’s signal, see
Kim (2003). Compared to the usual conditions of one-sender games, addi-
tional conditions are needed to preclude such a possibility. The following
no-jamming conditions are sufficient for our purpose: The advertising cost
function and the parameter θˆ satisfy cxx(z, x) ≥ 0, cx(2θˆγ,−2θˆγ) ≤ −1/4θˆ,
cx(−2θˆγ, 2θˆγ) ≥ 1/4θˆ. These conditions ensure that the difference between
the literal meaning of a message and the true quality differential has a suffi-
ciently large effect on advertising costs.
Proposition 4: The following strategies and beliefs constitute an equilib-
rium. If x ∈ [−1,−2θˆγ], firm 1 sends the message σ1(x) solving (4) with
σ1(−2θˆγ) = −2θˆγ while firm 2 doesn’t advertise. If x ∈ (−2θˆγ, 2θˆγ), nei-
ther firm advertises. If x ∈ [2θˆγ, 1], firm 2 sends the message σ2(x) solving
(5) with σ2(2θˆγ) = 2θˆγ and firm 1 doesn’t advertise. If one firm adver-
tises, consumers infer the true quality differential; if neither firm advertises,
consumers rationally expect a quality differential of zero.
Again the states of the world where firms advertise or are silent are exactly
the same as in the pure disclosure framework; see Figure 2.
The proof specifies out-of-equilibrium beliefs that support the equilib-
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rium. The beliefs have the following property: at an out-of-equilibrium in-
formation set consumers believe (when possible) that it was reached with the
minimum number of deviations from the equilibrium strategies. For instance,
the pair of messages (z1, z2) where z1 ≤ −2θˆγ and z2 < 2θˆγ is not part of
the equilibrium path. Should consumers observe such a pair, they believe
that firm 1 played its equilibrium strategy while firm 2 got it wrong. Hence,
they believe that the true differential is x solving σ1(x) = z1. A similar re-
finement, which we call the minimality condition, has been used by Bagwell
and Ramey (1991), Schultz (1999), and Emons and Fluet (2009).
For the quadratic cost function c(zi, x) = γ+ .5(zi−x)2, z1 and z2 satisfy
z1 + [1− e2θˆ(z1+2θˆγ)]/2θˆ = x with z1 ≤ x ≤ −2θˆγ, (6)
z2 − [1− e−2θˆ(z2−2θˆγ)]/2θˆ = x with z2 ≥ x ≥ 2θˆγ. (7)
These strategies are illustrated in Figure 5. The quadratic cost function
satisfies the no-jamming conditions if γ ≥ 1/(4θˆ)2.
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Figure 5: The signalling strategies with quadratic costs
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4.3 Welfare
We now compare the equilibria described in the Propositions 3 and 4. The
welfare comparison is the same as in the disclosure set-up in the areas a, d
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and f ; see Figure 3. The comparison is ambiguous in region b for the same
reasons as under pure disclosure.
Consider the areas c2 and e, say in the top half of the figure. Along
the lower boundary of these areas, the cost of the comparative message is
γ. The cost of a non-comparative ad is at least as large because messages
incorporate boasting except when q2 = 4θˆγ; moreover costs are duplicated in
region e. Thus, along the lower boundary of c1 and e comparative advertising
performs better, either because consumers are better informed or the overall
advertising expenditure is smaller. By continuity, there is, therefore, a region
in c1 and e where comparative advertising does better. Without additional
assumptions, however, one cannot be sure that comparative advertising does
better over the whole of the areas c1 and e. The reason is that the comparison
of advertising costs can go either way.11
Finally, consider the area c1. At the lower boundary, i.e., for q2 = 4θˆγ, a
non-comparative ad costs γ; a comparative ad delivers more information but
is typically more expensive. Thus, although comparative advertising must
perform better in some part of c1, the comparison is generally ambiguous
in this area. Overall, in the signalling framework non-comparative advertis-
ing does somewhat less well than comparative advertising compared to the
disclosure framework.
As a particular case, consider our quadratic cost example. Here we have
the following result.
Lemma 3: With quadratic costs c(y, q) = γ + .5(y − q)2 and c(z, x) = γ +
.5(z−x)2, advertising costs at equilibrium are larger for the non-comparative
than for the comparative advertiser in c2 and e and lower in c1.
In c2 the non-comparative advertiser has the same fixed cost but a larger
variable signalling cost than the comparative advertiser. Moreover, non-
11This is true even when comparative and non- comparative ads involve the same cost
function c(·, ·).
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comparative advertising provides less information. Thus, information is bet-
ter and signalling less costly under comparative advertising.
In e the information is the same under both regimes. However, each
non-comparative advertiser has a higher signalling cost than the single com-
parative advertiser: the fixed cost is the same, and variable cost is higher.
Furthermore, costs are duplicated under non-comparative advertising.
5 Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this paper is to analyze non-comparative and comparative ad-
vertising in a framework where firms disclose or signal their quality. Compar-
ative advertising tends to perform better in our set-up than non-comparative
advertising: firms do not advertise at all if the informational content is of
little value to consumers; moreover, they never advertise together. By con-
trast, under non-comparative advertising a firm advertises if its quality level
is above a threshold. When both firms have high quality, both advertise
leading to a duplication of advertising costs.
We have considered a model where the market is covered so that only
the quality differential matters, which obviously makes a strong case for
comparative advertising. If, for example, prices are so high that neither
established nor quality-conscious customers with θ close to zero buy, marginal
consumers do not care about the quality differential; they care only about
the quality of their favorite designs. In this case firms will only use non-
comparative advertising and allowing for comparative advertising will have
no effect.
Nevertheless, in markets where consumers directly compare products
there is scope for comparative advertising to improve the allocation through
better information and lower advertising expenditures. Our result that only
one firm uses comparative advertising is obviously driven by our one-dimen-
sional quality assumption. As noted in the introduction, this is at odds with
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the empirical findings of Anderson et al. (2010 a,b) where all firms used com-
parative advertising. Arguably, in the analgesics industry there are multiple
quality features and firms claim superiority in the dimensions where they
perform better. Analyzing comparative advertising with multiple quality
features is an interesting topic for future research.
In our analysis of the signalling set-up we focused on separating equi-
libria. When comparative advertising is allowed, this entailed a two-sender
communication game where both firms can potentially send conflicting sig-
nals about the same variable. We assumed that signalling costs satisfied
a “no-jamming” condition which ensured separation in an equilibrium with
the same basic structure as under pure disclosure. Relaxing this condition is
another topic for future research. Presumably this will bear on the welfare
analysis of comparative versus non-comparative advertising.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2. We complete the argument ruling out pairs of messages of the
form (q′1, q2). The following notation different from what we use in the main text
turns out to be useful. We denote i’s action by (yi1, y
i
2) where y
i
j ∈ {qj , ∅ij} is the
statement about firm j’s quality; qj means that j’s quality is disclosed; ∅ij means
that i says nothing about j’s quality; (∅i1, ∅i2) means that i does not advertise. A
pair of messages is denoted by ((y11, y
1
2), (y
2
1, y
2
2)). We want to show that a pair of
the form A := ((q′1, ∅12), (∅21, q2)) is never played at equilibrium.
Suppose the contrary. Given that firm 2 advertises when the state is (q′1, q2),
by monotonicity it also does at (q1, q2) for q1 < q′1. From the argument in the text,
we know that, for q1 sufficiently small, firm 1 will not advertise when firm 2 plays
(∅21, q2). From the same argument, we also know, however, that no-advertising by
firm 1 together with firm 2 playing (∅21, q2) is not on the equilibrium path. The only
remaining possibility, therefore, is the existence of some critical value qc1 ∈ (0, q′1)
at which (i) firm 2 switches from non-comparative to comparative advertising and
(ii) firm 1 switches from non-comparative advertising to no-advertising.
Consider the state (qc1 + ε, q2) where ε > 0 and small. At that state both
firms reveal their own quality. In order for firm 1 not to deviate to no-advertising,
consumers, upon observing B := ((∅11, ∅12), (∅21, q2)), must hold a belief qˆ1 < qc1.
Consider now the state (qc1 − η, q2) where η > 0. Now firm 1 does not advertise,
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while firm 2 reveals both qualities. If firm 2 deviates to non-comparative adver-
tising, consumers also observe B. For η small enough, qˆ1 < qc1 − η, implying that
the deviation is strictly profitable for firm 2. 
Proof of Proposition 4. We provide out-of-equilibrium beliefs supporting the equi-
librium. It suffices to consider the case where firm 1 plays its prescribed strategy
while firm 2 deviates. The argument is similar for deviations by firm 1.
a) Let x > −2θˆγ so that firm 1 plays ∅1 at equilibrium. The pair of mes-
sages observed by consumers is off the equilibrium path if firm 2 sends a a non-
comparative message y2 or a comparative message z2< 2θˆγ. In either case, from
the minimality condition, consumers believe that firm 2 deviated while firm 1 stuck
to its equilibrium strategy. Hence, they must hold beliefs consistent with the play
of ∅1 by firm 1, i.e., they believe that x belongs to (−2θˆγ, 1]. Any inference
xˆ ∈ (−2θˆγ, 2θˆγ) is sufficient to deter such deviations by firm 2. The argument is
that these deviations are dominated by the play of ∅2, in which case consumers
would infer xˆ = 0; that is, compared to the play of ∅2, advertising costs at least
γ and is not worth the cost if consumers believe xˆ < 2θˆγ.
b) Let x ≤ −2θˆγ so that firm 1 plays z1= σ1(x) at equilibrium. The pair of
messages observed by consumers is off the equilibrium path if firm 2 sends a a
non-comparative message y2, a comparative message z2< 2θˆγ or a comparative
message z2≥ 2θˆγ. In the first two cases, from the minimality condition, consumers
believe that firm 2 deviated while firm 1 played its equilibrium strategy. Hence they
infer that the true differential is the solution to z1= σ1(x). Because advertising
costs are incurred without affecting beliefs, the first two deviations are therefore
not profitable for firm 2.
In the third case, consumers observe a pair of messages of the form (z1, z2)
with z1≤ −2θˆγ and z2≥ 2θˆγ. They therefore know that at least one firm has
deviated but do not know which. From the minimality condition, they believe
that at most one did. Thus, they believe that x ∈ {σ−11 (z1), σ−12 (z2)}. Suppose
they believe the two possibilities are equiprobable. Their inference is then
xˆ = .5σ−1 1(z1) + .5σ
−
2 1(z2) = .5x+ 5x2
where x = σ−11 (z1) because firm 1 is playing its equilibrium strategy and where
x2:= σ
−1
2 (z2) is the quality differential that firm 2 is mimicking. Written as a
function of the latter and of the true state, firm 2’s profit is
pi2(x2, x) = .5+(x+ x2)/4θˆ−c(σ2(x2), x).
The profit from its prescribed equilibrium strategy ∅2 is
pi2(∅2, x) = .5+x/2θˆ.
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Define
ϕ(x2, x) := pi2(x2)− pi2(∅2) =(x2 − x)/4θˆ−c(σ2(x2), x).
We show that ϕ(x2, x) < 0 for all x ≤ −2θˆγ and x2≥ 2θˆγ.
First
ϕx2(x2, x) = 1/4θˆ−cz(σ2(x2), x)σ′2(x2))
= 1/4θˆ−cz(σ2(x2), x)/2θˆcz(σ2(x2), x2)< 0,
where we substituted for σ′2(x2) from condition (5). The inequality follows from
the single-crossing property and the fact that x2> x. Thus ϕ(x2, x) is maximized
at x2= 2θˆγ. Now
ϕ(2θˆγ, x) = −x/4θˆ+γ/2−c(2θˆγ, x).
In particular,
ϕ(2θˆγ,−2θˆγ) = γ − c(2θˆγ,−2θˆγ) < 0.
Next we show that ϕ(2θˆγ, x) is maximized at x = −2θˆγ. Differentiating with
respect to x,
ϕx(2θˆγ, x) = −1/4θˆ−cx(2θˆγ, x) ≥ 0 for x ≤ −2θˆγ.
The inequality follows from the no-jamming condition. Hence
ϕ(x2, x) ≤ ϕ(2θˆγ, x) ≤ ϕ(2θˆγ,−2θˆγ) < 0
for all x ≤ −2θˆγ and x2≥ 2θˆγ. 
Proof of Lemma 2. Consider firm 2. Let sˆ(q2) := s(q2) − q2. Substituting in (3)
yields
sˆ(q2) = [1− e−2θˆ(sˆ(q2)+q2−4θˆγ)]/2θˆ, for q2 ≥ 4θˆγ
Likewise, let σˆ2(x) := σ2(x)− x. Substituting in (5),
σˆ2(x) = [1− e−2θˆ(σˆ2(x)+x−2θˆγ)]/2θˆ, for x ≥ 2θˆγ.
Let t and t′ be such that sˆ(t′) = σˆ2(t). Thus
[1− e−2θˆ(sˆ(t′)+t′−4θˆγ)]/2θˆ = [1− e−2θˆ(σˆ2(t)+t−2θˆγ)]/2θˆ,
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which yields
t′ = t+ 2θˆγ.
Since sˆ(·) and σˆ2(·) are increasing functions, it follows that for t′ > t + 2θˆγ,
sˆ(t′) > σˆ2(t). Conversely, t′ < t+ 2θˆγ implies sˆ(t′) < σˆ2(t).
With the quadratic cost function, advertising costs are larger for a non-compar-
ative than for a comparative ad when sˆ(q2) ≥ σˆ2(q2−q1) and are smaller otherwise.
In the areas c2 and e of Figure 3, q1 ≥ 2θˆγ so that q2 ≥ q2 − q1 + 2θˆγ. From the
preceding result, it follows that sˆ(q2) ≥ σˆ2(q2 − q1). In the area c1, q1 < 2θˆγ so
that q2 < q2 − q1 + 2θˆγ. Hence, sˆ(q2) < σˆ2(q2 − q1). 
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